Encryption and Forensics/Data Hiding

Cryptography Background

See:

http://www.cacr.math.uwaterloo.ca/hac/

For more information

Security Objectives

Confidentiality (Secrecy): Prevent/Detect/Deter improper disclosure of information Availability: Prevent/Detect/Deter Integrity: improper denial of access to Prevent/Detect/Deter improper services provided by the modification of information system

Security Services

- Confidentiality: protection of any information from being exposed to unintended entities.
 - Information content
 - Parties involved
 - Where they are, how they communicate, how often, etc.
- Authentication: assurance that an entity of concern or the origin of a communication is authentic it's what it claims to be or from
- Integrity: assurance that the information has not been tampered with

Encryption/Decryption

plaintext encryption ciphertext decryption plaintext

- Plaintext: a message in its original form
- Ciphertext: a message in the transformed, unrecognized form
- Encryption: the process for producing ciphertext from plaintext
- Decryption: the reverse of encryption
- Key: a secret value used to control encryption/decryption

Cryptanalysis: Break an Encryption Scheme

- Ciphertext only
 - Analyze only with the ciphertext
 - Exhaustive search until "recognizable plaintext"
 - Need enough ciphertext
- Known Plaintext
 - <plaintext, ciphertext> is obtained
 - Great for monoalphabetic cipher
- Chosen Plaintext:
 - Choose plaintext, get the ciphertext
 - Useful if limited set of messages

Methods for Attacking Encrypted Text

- Table 4-1 of the textbook
- Cryptanalysis
 - Ciphertext only
 - Analyze only with the ciphertext
 - Exhaustive search until "recognizable plaintext"
 - Need enough ciphertext
 - Known Plaintext
 - <plaintext, ciphertext> is obtained
 - Chosen Plaintext:
 - Choose plaintext, get the ciphertext
 - Useful if limited set of messages
- Password Guess (Similar to known plaintext)
 - Dictionary
 - Educated Guess
 - Brute Force

Methods for Attacking Encrypted Text - Con't

- Scavenge Password
 - Physical Search
 - Logical Search
 - Network Sniff


Computationally Difficult

- Cryptographic algorithms need to be reasonably efficient
- Cryptographic algorithms are not impossible to break with the key
 - e.g. try all the keys brute-force cryptanalysis
 - Time can be saved by spending money on more computers.
- A scheme can be made more secure by making the key longer
 - Increase the length of the key by one bit
 - The good guy's job just a little bit harder
 - The bad guy's job up to twice as hard.


Types of Cryptographic functions

- Secret Key Cryptography
 One key
- Public Key Cryptography
 Two keys: public, private
- Hash function
 - No key

Secret Key Cryptography



- Same key is used for both encryption and decryption
 - Symmetric cryptography
 - Conventional cryptography
- Ciphertext is about the same length as the plaintext
- Examples: DES, IDEA, AES...



- Invented/published in 1975
- Each individual has two keys:
 - Private key is kept secret
 - Public key is publicly known
- Much slower than secret key cryptography
- Also known as

Asymmetric cryptography

Public Key Cryptography cont'd



- Digital Signature
 - Only the party with the private key can generate a digital signature
 - Verification of the signature only requires the knowledge of the public key
 - The signer cannot deny he/she has done so.
 - Example illustrated in Fig. 4-4 and 4-5

Applications of Public Key Cryptography

- Security uses of public key cryptography
 - Known public key cryptography is orders of magnitude slower than the best known secret key cryptographic algo.
- Transmitting over an Insecure Channel

Alice Bob Encrypt m_A using $e_{B} \longrightarrow Decrypt$ to m_A using d_{B}

Decrypt to m_B using $d_A \leftarrow Encrypt m_B$ using e_A

- e: public key, d: private key
- Secure Storage on Insecure Media
 - Because of performance issues, you can randomly generate a secret key, encrypt the data with that secret key, and encrypt the secret key with the public key
 - Using public key of a trusted person

Hash Algorithms

• Message digests, one-way transformations

 $\begin{array}{ccc} \text{Message of} \\ \text{arbitrary length} \end{array} \longrightarrow \text{Hash h} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{c} \text{A fixed-length} \\ \text{short message} \end{array}$

- Easy to compute h(m)
- Given h(m), no easy way to find m
- Computationally infeasible to find m_1 and m_2 , so that $h(m_1) = h(m_2)$

Trusted Intermediaries

- Cannot do pair-wise authentication with secret key technology
 - Each computer needs to know n-1 keys
- Key Distribution Center (KDC)
- Certification Authorities (CAs)
- Certificate

Key Distribution Center

- Use a trusted node known as Key Distribution Center (KDC)
 - Secret key cryptography
- The KDC knows keys for all nodes
 - α asks KDC for secret (securely) to talk to β
 - KDC encrypts $R_{\alpha\beta}$ with the key shared between α and KDC, send to α
 - KDC encrypts $R_{\alpha\beta}$ with the key shared between β and KDC, send to β : ticket

Certification Authorities (CAs)

- Public key cryptography
 - Problem: How can you be sure that the public keys are correct?
- CA: ensure validity of public keys
- Certificates
 - Signed messages specifying a name (Alice) and the corresponding public key
 - All nodes need to be preconfigured with the CA's public key

Certificate Authorities Trusted by IE

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Certification Practice Statement

- Certification Practice Statement (CPS)
 - How certificate authorities operate, maintain the security of their infrastructures.
 - Certificate Revocation List
- One example:
 - Verisign CPS
 - <u>http://www.verisign.com/repository/CPS/</u>

Codes and Compression

- uuencode
 - http://www.winzip.com/uu00002.htm
 - Uuencoding obscures binary data, but not ASCII text
 - Winzip can open and extract uuencoded files
- Compression
 - Recognizable patterns
 - Lossless data compression
 - Zip, gzip
 - GIF, TIFF..
 - Lossy data compression
 - JPEG, MPEG...
- Data is often compressed before it is encrypted

Challenges

- Any transformation performed on text data make it difficult or impossible to do a batch search for keywords!
- How to identify encrypted data
 To see if it can be compressed

Password recovery tool for Windows

- Cain:
 - <u>http://www.oxid.it/cain.html</u> (Doc: http://www.oxid.it/ca_um/)
 - Uncovering cached password
 - Recovering password by sniffing the network
 - Cracking encrypted password using Dictionary
 - Brute-force and Cryptanalysis attacks

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Cain – uncover password from protected storage

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Cain – attack against encrypted password

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Password Cracker

• www.lostpassword.com

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Recover Support	
File: C:\My Documents\report.doc	
Xieve attack has found the password. Done: tested 2,800,626 passwords in 27sec Passwords/second: 1,607,149 effective, 125,859 real	
File password: [purple] (no brackets) <copy></copy>	
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- L0phCrack
- ZipPassword

Hiding and Finding Data

- Changing a file's extension
 - Windows uses the filename extension to identify the data type of the file
 - Quick View Plus
- Check the file header
 - Contain a hexadecimal value that can be usually be correlated to file type
- File Format Information

- http://www.wotsit.org/

Steganography

- Steganos: secret or hidden
- Graphy: drawing or writing
- http://www.stegoarchive.com/



File Systems

	FAT12	FAT16	FAT32			
Developer	Microsoft					
Full Name	le					
	(12-bit version)	(16-bit version)	(32-bit version)			
Introduced	1977 (Microsoft Disk BASIC)	July 1988 (MS-DOS 4.0)	August 1996 (Windows 95 OSR2)			
Partition identifier	0x01 (MBR)	0x04, 0x06, 0x0E (MBR)	0x0B, 0x0C (MBR) EBD0A0A2-B9E5-4433 -87C0-68B6B72699C7 (GPT)			

• Windows NT and Windows XP support NTFS, FAT16, and FAT 32.

NTFS Alternate Data Streams (ADS)

- NTFS file systems supports multiple data streams
- Allow files to be associated with more than one data stream
- Method of hiding executables or proprietary content
- Uses NTFS file system multiple attributes
- Syntax {file name}:{stream name}
- Create: type file > visible:hidden
- Reference:
 - <u>http://www.windowsecurity.com/articles/Alternate_Data_S</u> <u>treams.html</u>

ADS Example 1

C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe	- 🗆 ×
C:∖temp>dir Volume in drive C has no label. Volume Serial Number is ACA2-CC6D	
Directory of C:\temp	
09/10/2006 01:36 PM <dir> 09/10/2006 01:36 PM <dir> 08/12/2004 08:17 AM 114,688 calc.exe 08/12/2004 08:25 AM 69,120 notepad.exe 2 File(s) 183,808 bytes 2 Dir(s) 13,415,890,944 bytes free</dir></dir>	
C:\temp>type notepad.exe > calc.exe:notepad.exe	
C:∖temp>dir Volume in drive C has no label. Volume Serial Number is ACA2-CC6D	
Directory of C:\temp	
09/10/2006 01:36 PM <dir> 09/10/2006 01:36 PM <dir> 09/10/2006 01:37 PM 114,688 calc.exe 08/12/2004 08:25 AM 69,120 notepad.exe 2 File(s) 183,808 bytes 2 Dir(s) 13,415,821,312 bytes free</dir></dir>	
C:\temp>	-

• *start c:\temp\calc.exe:notepad.exe*

ADS Example 2

C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe	- 🗆 🗙
Microsoft Windows XP [Version 5.1.2600] (C) Copyright 1985-2001 Microsoft Corp.	
C:\Documents and Settings\Bo Sun>cd//Templates The system cannot find the path specified.	
C:\Documents and Settings\Bo Sun>cd//temp	
C:\temp>more hidden.txt This is the text I am gonna hide	
C:\temp>more visible.txt This is the visible text	
C:\temp>	

ADS Example 2 – Con't

	C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe	- 🗆 🗙
	C:∖temp>dir Volume in drive C has no label. Volume Serial Number is ACA2-CC6D	
	Directory of C:\temp	
	09/10/2006 01:47 PM (DIR) 09/10/2006 01:47 PM (DIR) 09/10/2006 01:37 PM 114,688 calc.exe 09/10/2006 01:46 PM 32 hidden.txt 08/12/2004 08:25 AM 69,120 notepad.exe 09/10/2006 01:45 PM 24 visible.txt 4 File(s) 183,864 bytes 2 Dir(s) 13,362,962,432 bytes free	
	C:\temp>type hidden.txt>visible.txt:hidden.txt	
	C:\temp>dir Volume in drive C has no label. Volume Serial Number is ACA2-CC6D	
2	Directory of C:\temp	
	09/10/2006 01:47 PM (DIR) 09/10/2006 01:47 PM (DIR) 09/10/2006 01:37 PM 114,688 calc.exe 09/10/2006 01:46 PM 32 hidden.txt 08/12/2004 08:25 AM 69,120 notepad.exe 09/10/2006 01:47 PM 24 visible.txt 4 File(s) 183,864 bytes 2 Dir(s) 13,365,678,080 bytes free	
	C:\temp>	-

ADS Example 2– Con't

C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe

Directory of C:\temp

09/10/2006 01:47 PM <DIR> 09/10/2006 01:47 PM <DIR> 09/10/2006 01:37 PM 114.688 calc.exe 09/10/2006 01:46 PM 32 hidden.txt 08/12/2004 08:25 AM 69,120 notepad.exe Ø1:45 PM 24 visible.txt 09/10/2006 4 File(s) 183,864 bytes 2 Dir(s) 13,362,962,432 bytes free C:\temp>type hidden.txt>visible.txt:hidden.txt C:\temp>dir

Volume in drive C has no label. Volume Serial Number is ACA2-CC6D

Directory of C:\temp

09/10/2006 01:47 PM <DIR> 09/10/2006 01:47 PM <DIR> 01:37 PM 09/10/2006 114.688 calc.exe 09/10/2006 01:46 PM 32 hidden.txt 08/12/2004 08:25 AM 69,120 notepad.exe 09/10/2006 01:47 PM 24 visible.txt 183.864 bytes 4 File(s) 2 Dir(s) 13,365,678,080 bytes free

C:\temp>more < visible.txt:hidden.txt This is the text I am gonna hide

C:∖temp≻

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LADS – List Alternate Data Streams

• http://www.heysoft.de/nt/ep-lads.htm

C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe	- 🗆 ×
C:\>cd temp	
C:\temp>./lads '.' is not recognized as an internal or external command, operable program or batch file.	
C:\temp>lads	
LADS - Freeware version 4.00 (C) Copyright 1998-2004 Frank Heyne Software (http://www.heysoft.de) This program lists files with alternate data streams (ADS) Use LADS on your own risk! Scanning directory C:\temp\	
size ADS in file	
69120 C:\temp\calc.exe:notepad.exe 26 C:\temp\lads.zip:Zone.Identifier 32 C:\temp\visible.txt:hidden.txt	
69178 bytes in 3 ADS listed	
C:\temp>	-